Foreword
If somebody asked me to ciesign a book that would introduce the most importa.:~t ideas in artificial intelligence (AI) to a wider audience, I would try to work to the fol-· lowing principles: ---'
1. Go for details. Instead of presenting yet another impressionistic overview '~f the field, concentrate on the details of a' particular AI model, so that the readers can see for themselves just how and why it works, ~eeing its weaknesses and boundaries as well as its showcase triumphs. 2. Model something we all know intimately. Choose a psychological phenomenon that is familiar to everyone-and intrinsically interesting. Not everybody plays chess or solves route-minimization problems, and although we almost all can see, unless we are vision scientists, we have scant direct familiarity with the details of how our visual processes work.
3. Explain exactly how the particular model supports or refutes, supplements or clarifies the other research on the same phenomenon, including work by people in other diSCiplines. 4. Give concrete illustrations of the important ideas at work. A Single welldeveloped example of a concept applied is often better than ten pages 0:
definition.
This book by Bob French all about his Tabletop model fills the bill perfectly, so when I read an early draft of it (I was a member of his Ph.D. dissertation committee), I encouraged him to publisn it and offered to write a foreword. From its easily read pages, you will come to know the model inside out, not only seeing that it comes up with recognizably human ?erformance but seeing-really seeing-how it comes :l? with its results . And what does it do? It does something we all do every day: it appreciates analogies. It creates them and perceives them, in a manner of speaking. The simple setting of the task is inspired: a game of "Do this!" whose point you will ge:
ill an instant, but whose richer possibilities are not only surprising, but quite inexhaustible.
You get to tackle all the problems yourself and think about them "from the nrstperson point of view." Something goes on in you when you do these problems. What on earth is it? It seems at first the farthest thing from mechanizable-"ir'.-tuitive," quirky, fluid, aesthetic, quintessentially human-just the sort of phenomenon that the skeptics would be tempted to brandish, saying, "You'll never get a computer to do this!" Or, more cautiously, "You'll never get a computer to do tres the way we do it!" If you are such a skeptic, you are in for a surprise.
Most AI programs model phenomena that are either highly intellectualized thinking exercises in the first place-like playing chess or constructing proofs-or else low-level processes that are quite beneath our ken-like extracting three-dimensional information about the visible world from binocular overlap, texture gradients, and s:'ading. French's program, in contrast, models a phenomenon that is neither difficult nor utterly invisible but rather jt!sf out of reach to the introspecting reader. We can almost analyze our own direct experiences into the steps that French's model exhibits. AI workers love acronyms, and I hereby introduce the term AIGLE5-almostintrospectible, grain-level events-as the general term for the sort of high-level psychological phenomenon French has modeled. If there were a Cartesian Theater in our brains, across whose stage the parade ' of consciousness marched, his would be a model of something that happens immediately backstage. (Those who join me in renouncing the ali-tao-popular image of the Cartesian Theater have a nontrivial task of explaining why and how French's model can avoid falling into that forlorn trap, but this is not the time or place for me to discharge that burden. It is left. as an exercise for the reader.)
From the particulars, we can appreciate the general. French introduces, exemplifies, and explains some of the most important and ill-understood ideas in current AI. For instance, almost everyb02y these days speaks dismissive!y of the bad old days in AI and talks instead about "emergence," while waving nands about self-organizing syster:1S that settle into coherent structures and so forth. (I myself have spoken of multiple drafts in competition, out of which transient winners emerge, a tantalizingly metaphorical description of the processes I claim are involved in human consciousness.) French provides a no-nonsense model of just such a system. When posed a problem, the answer it arrives at is "the emergent result of the interaction of many parallel unconscious processes" (p. 20). So here is a fine place to see what all the hoopla is about. You get to see how the currently popular metaphors-a batch of cooling molecules or a system of interconnected resonators coming to vibrate in unison, for instance-apply to an actual nonmetaphorical reality, a system engaged in doing some undeniably mental work.
His model also illustrates a version of "dynamic" memory structures, which deform to fit the current context, and it achieves its results by explOiting a "parallel-terraced scan." It accomplishes "implicit pruning," which must somehow be what we manage to do when we ignore the irrelevancies that always surround us. It does this by building (and rebuilding and rebuilding) the relevant structures on the fly, thereby avoiding at least some of the "combinatorial explOSions" that threaten all AI models that have to ignore most of what they could attend to without catastrophically ignoring the important points. The central theme of the book is that the processes of producing mental ' representations and manipulating them are inextricably intertwined. As French puts it, "You must take the ~epresentation problem into consideration while you are doing processing." When you understand this paragraph in detail (and you will when you have read the book), you will have a good grip on some of the central ldeas in recent AI.
These ideas are not just French's of course. His work grows out of the family of projects undertaken in recent years by Douglas Hofsta(b~,'s group at Indiana University and, as such, provides a fine demonstration of the powers of that school of thought in AI. Many skeptics and critics of AI from other disciplines have surmised there was something profoundly wrong about the hard-edged, inert (but manipulable) symbols of the "physical-symbol systems" of traditional AI, and he:-.ce they have been intrigued by Hofstadter's radical alternative: "active symbols." Active symbols sound great, bt.:r what are they, and how on earth could they work? This book takes us a few sure steps toward the answer. French provides a judicious comparison of his own work-which has plenty of its own originality-to that of others who have worked on a.-:alogy, in Hofstadter's group, in AI more generally, and in psychology.
If you don't already a?preciate it, you will come to appreciate the curious combination of ambition ar.c modesty that marks most work in AI and the work or Horstadter and his coilec.5· ...:es in particular. On the one hand, the models are rreme:1-ciously abstract, not ties at all to brain architecture or to the known details of such processes as "early vision.'~ All the important questions in these research domains are simply sidestepped. That's modesty. On the other hand, the models purport to be getting at something truly fundamental in the underlying structure and rationale of the actual processes that must go on in the brain. That's ambition. Like more traditional AI programs, they often achieve their triumphs by heroic simplification: helping themselves to ruthless-even comical-truncations of the phenomena (more modesty), in order, it is caimed, to provide a feasible working model of the essential underlying process (more ambition). The reader is left, quite properly, with an unanswered question about just which helpings of Simplification might be poisoned. Are any of these bold decisions fatal oversimplifications that could not possibly be removed without undoing the ambitious claims? There is something that is both right and deep about this modeL I am sure, but saying just what it is and how it will map onto lower-level models of brain function is still beyond me and everybody else at this time, a tantalizing patch of fog.
French's program doesn't learn at all-except what it could be said to learn in the course of tackling a single problem. It has no long-term memory of its activities, and it never g~ts any better. This might seem to be a horrible shortcoming, but it has an l.:nusual bonus: his prog:-a.rn never gets bored! You can give it the same problem over and over and over, and :t never rebels but always takes it in a fresh spirit. This is exce!lent for "rewinding t;"e tape"-looking, counterfactuaUy, at what else a system lTljght do if put in the sa:ne situation again. Heraclitus said that you can never step into the same river twice, and this is particularly true of human beings, thankS to our memories. Aside from a few famous amnesiacs, we normal human beings are never re::lotely in the same sta~e twice, and this seriously impedes scientific research on inman cognitive mecha..-isms. Is investigating a system with total amnesia, like F,ench's, a worthy substitute for non-doable human experiments, or does the absence of memory and learning vitiate his model? French shows that AI fell into a trap when it opportunistically separated the building of representations from their processing; will some meta-French soen come along to show that he fell into just as bad a trap by setting long-term leaniing aside for the time being? A good question-which is to say that no one should think that the pessimistic answer is obvious. In the end, at some leveL no doubt just about everything is inextricably intertwined with everything else, but if we are to understand the main features of this tangled bank. we must force some temporary separation on them.
A standard conflict in AI is between the hard edges and the fuzzies, a conflict fought on many battlefields, and some of the niftiest features of French's model denlonsrrare what happens when you slide back and forth between hard edges and fuzzy edges. There are knobs, in effed, that you can tum, thereby setting parameters on the model to give you nice sharp edges or terribly fuzzy edges or something in bem-een. Probability plays a deep role in French's model, which makes it imperative fo r ~im to test his model in adion many, many times and gather statistics on its performancesomething that would not be at all motivated in most traditional AI. But if you set the model so that some of the probabilities are ve"0 close to I or 0, you can tum it into what amounts to a deterministic, hard-edged model. Or you can explore the trade-off between depth-first search and breadth-first search, by adjusting the "rho" fador, or you can create what French calls a semi-s tack, another fuzzy version of a hard-edged idea. This is a particularly attractive set of features, for one of the things we know about ourselves is that the appearance of determinism and indeterminism in our mental life is highly variable.
AI is a seductive field. Even a book as scrupulously written as French's may mislead you into ignoring deep problems or deficiencies in the model, or-a very common foible-it may encourage you to overestimate the actual fidelity or power of the model. Here, for the benefit of neophytes, are a few of the tough questions you should keep asking yourself as you read. (You will get a better sense of the genuine strengths of French's mod el by making sure you know just what its weaknesses are.)
French claims his domain, the (apparently) concrete world of Tabletop, is rich enough to "ground" the symbols of his model in a way that the sym!::>ols of most I'J programs are not grounded. Is this really so? We· viewers of Tabletop see the knives, forks, spoons, cups, bowls, and so forth, vividly laid out in space, but what does the model really understand about the shape of these objects? Anything? Does Tabletop know that a spoon, with its concavity, is more like a bowl than a knife is? vVe can see that a spoon is a sort of bowl on a stick, but that is utterly unknown to Tabletop. What other sorts of obvious facts about tableware are left out of Tabletop'S semantics, and how could they be added? Perhaps it is here that we see most clearly what the model leaves out when it leaves out learning-in the real world of concrete experience. But what difference, if any, does this make to the groundedness of T abletop's symbols? Is there some other sense in which Tabletop is clearly superior in "groundedness" to other p rograms? (I think the answer is yes. Can you see how?)
Tabletop gets its basic perceptual accomplishments for free. It cannot mistake a knife for a fork out of the corner of its eye or fail to see the second spoon as a spoon (if it ever directs its attention to it). Everything placed on the table is, as it were, legibly and corredly labeled according to its type. So what? (Might some of the combinatorial explOSions so deftly avoided by Tabletop COr:1e back to haunt it if this gift were revoked? Again, so what?)
What would it take to add learning to Tabletop? What would it take to expand the domain to other topics? What would happen if you tried to add episodic memory? Could you readily embed Tabletop in a larger system that could face the decision of whether or not to play the Tab letop game, or play it in good faith? (A human ? layer could get fed up and start giving deliberately "bad" answers to try to drive "Henry" into one amusing state of frustration or another. Is this a ieature whose absence from Tabletop could be readily repaired, or would a model builder have to start over from scratch to include it?)
Finally, the granddaddy of all challenging questions for any AI program: Since this model purports to be right about something, how could we tell if it was wrong?
What sort of discovery, in particular, would refute it? The boring way of responding to this question is to try to concod some philosophical argument to show why "in principle" Tabletop couldn't be right. The exciting ways are to be found down the paths leading from the otr.e, questions.
My raising of these challenging questions in the foreword is the most unignorab:e way I can think of to der:1onstrate my confidence in the strength and value of this book. Go ahead; give it your best shot.
Daniel Dennett
